A Fishy Cold War Tale of British Intelligence Skulduggery in the Baltic
MI6 set up the ‘Baltic Fishery Protection Service’ in 1951 as cover for ex-Nazi motor torpedo boats with German crews to land British spies in Soviet territory.
In March 1951 the British Royal Navy established the ‘Baltic Fishery Protection Service.’ But this was not out of a sudden concern to protect British commercial interests in the Baltic, or anywhere else.
Rather, the ‘Service’ and the whole operation was created as cover for British Intelligence to continue operations to land spies behind Soviet lines, using ex-Kriegsmarine crews who had served Admiral Dönitz in the war, and the speedy motor torpedo ‘E-Boats’ surrendered by the German navy to the British at the end of hostilities. Kapitänleutnant Hans-Helmut Klose was the ex-Kriegsmarine officer the British turned to as commander for the spy smuggling operations. Klose was a decorated officer who had completed many successful ‘Schnellboot’ (‘E-Boat’) missions, including inserting agents and rescuing high-ranking Germans surrounded by advancing Russian forces, as well as more usual reconnaissance and escort operations. Klose and his fast boats successfully inserted many British (and later American) spies in Soviet occupied countries. But as with many true-life spy stories there was a twist in the tale that led to tragedy. Likely in large part because of the treachery of Soviet Spies inside the British Secret Service (MI6) many of the agents were only delivered to their deaths.
S-204, a WW2 German E-Boat (‘Schnellboot’) surrenders in Felixstowe at the end of the war:
At the end of hostilities in 1945 Kapitänleutnant Klose became one of the ex-Kriegsmarine officers to go to work for the British occupation authorities engaged in the mammoth task of clearing the harbours and sea-lanes of naval mines. He was first employed after the war by the German Minesweeping Authority, then the Minesweeping Group Cuxhaven.
Here the German officer came to the attention of British Intelligence. Klose was perceived by the British as a highly skilled naval commander and ‘pirate’ but judged to be ‘no Nazi’. He was, in fact, just what MI6 was looking for. The British spy service had been looking for ways to sneak spies into Soviet occupied countries, but when it had come to ask the Royal Navy for help with clandestine operations in the Baltic, they were turned down flat.
However, in May 1948, a British naval intelligence officer, Commander Antony Courtney, interviewed Klose and asked if he would be interested in putting his considerable skills and experience to work against the Soviets. Klose had seen and heard enough of the behaviour of advancing Russian armies during the war to be no friend of the Soviets. He accepted the British proposal. Whether his acceptance of the offer was for reasons of ideology, money, or adventure we do not know, as transcripts of his interview have not been found and Klose remained a professional throughout his life, not speaking openly about classified operations.
With Klose on board matters moved into full swing. A surrendered German Schnellboot was refitted and upgraded by the Royal Navy. By April 1949 S-208 was ready to go, Klose and his German crew sailing her out of Gosport prepared for their first mission to transport spies behind Soviet lines for MI6. The destination across the cold, rough, Baltic Sea was the Latvian coast. In this first ‘run’ Klose landed six British agents and he and his crew made good their escape, undetected by the Soviets.
As well as the human intelligence (HUMINT) missions smuggling spies for British SIS, Klose and his crew got involved in signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations for Royal Navy intelligence. Operating out of the German port of Kiel, under the command of Lt Commander John Harvey-Jones, Klose’s boats were sent on photographic and electronic intelligence gathering missions among Soviet ships on ‘Fleet manoeuvres’ in the Baltic. Klose and his crew photographed Soviet navy ships and collected as much information as they could before using their boats high-speed to make a run for it and avoid capture once they suspected they had been detected by the Russians; the refitted Schnellboot’s had a top speed of between forty and forty-five knots.
SIS and the Royal Navy soon realised the incredible value of Klose operations going forward and soon set about setting the German officer and his crew up on a more permanent basis. First, in 1951, they operated from Hamburg-Finkenwerder under the cover of the new Royal Navy established ‘Baltic Fishery Protection Service’. Then in 1952 the whole operation moved back to Kiel, joined by a second ex-German Schnellboot sister ship.
The success of Klose’s agent transport, known among the spies as ‘The Klose Fast Patrol Group’, was not lost on the Americans. In 1953 a co-operation agreement between the British and the CIA led to their agents, and agents of the US-backed Gehlen organisation, making use of the fast boats to be safely carried to Soviet occupied territories.
It didn’t last. Disastrously the situation of the spies once they had landed and embarked on their espionage activities in Soviet occupied countries was anything but safe. British SIS soon suspected that the Soviet’s had infiltrated the networks to which the spies were delivered. It is estimated that as many as forty agents were caught captured, tortured, executed or ‘turned’ to work as double agents by the Soviets. The betrayal of the spies likely involved information given by Kim Philby and other Soviet moles working within British Intelligence. Against this dreadful backdrop the landings by Schnellboot were terminated for good in 1955.
However, unlike the abject failure of the mission to put operational spies to work behind Soviet lines, there is more of a happy ending with regards to associated Royal Navy operations. There can be no doubt that the admirable skill, courage and professionalism of the Klose Fast Patrol Group helped to build trust in the immediate post-war period between the British and ex-Kriegsmarine officers and crews involved in the covert missions. The popular Klose was no doubt a leading figure in building bridges between the ex-combatants.
When the period of occupation by the Allied countries wound down, the nascent German Federal Republic that would assume control in the British, French and American zones needed a navy, as well as an army and air-force. In early 1956 as the new West German state joined NATO, the Bundesmarine was born. This meant the Baltic Fishery Protection Service was redundant and it was thus disbanded. Klose’s long serving S-130 and S-208 boats were fully restored and handed over in early 1957 to the West German navy, to continue their heroic service, now designated as UW 10 and UW 11. These two storied Schnellboot along with three other newer boats went on to form the core of the new ‘Schnellbootlehrgeschwaders (später 1. Schnellbootgeschwader)’ (‘1st Fast Torpedo Boat Squadron’), under the command of non-other than recently commissioned Bundesmarine Korvettenkapitän, Hans–Helmut Klose.
Klose would go on to have a distinguished navy career until a well-deserved retirement in the 1970’s, having risen to the rank of Rear Admiral (‘Konteradmiral’). It is entirely possible that after the war no other ex-Kriegsmarine officer did more than Klose to develop relations between the West German navy and their new comrades in arms in NATO. Together they faced the significant combined threat of the now nuclear-armed Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies.
Hans-Helmut Klose (seated), on HMS Victory, with RN Admiral Sir David Williams (1978):
Great story Mark, fascinating read and insight on the post war re-alignment of interests
Excellent post, Mark, thanks!